17 Members of Congress Want Answers on MEDEVAC
- Details
- Published: Monday, 06 February 2012 17:27
US Military Forges Ahead with Deadly Deceptions
Dhaka, Bangladesh
05 February 2012
The US military is toying with American lawmakers.
Based on two key documents submitted to individual Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee, by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Army, it’s clear that a concerted, organized attempt to deceive Congress is coming from DoD brass. Repeated deceptions regarding MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan continue to be perpetrated in writing by certain leadership elements within DoD. Rebuttal to an egregious JCS letter is published here.
Subsequent the JCS missive to Congress, the Army also began circulating a statement to Senators and Representatives after CBS aired a story revealing some of the MEDEVAC shortcomings.
03 February 2012
Nobody crucifies common sense like the US Army. During my morning search for anything MEDEVAC related, several new stories emerged, including one with these illustrative quotes from a Soldier returning from Iraq:
“You have to land where you never had to land before, surrounded by the enemy.”
In conventional warfare a vehicle or aircraft bearing a red cross is considered almost sacrosanct. Not so during the open, no holds barred atmosphere that permeated Iraq.
02 February 2012
An Army officer writes:
The Army is not resisting Dustoff policy change because our leadership honestly believes the current policy is superior, but rather because of AMEDD's [Army Medical Department] protectionist attitude toward "their" Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. I'm an active duty infantry officer, and I've been following the Dustoff issue since you first brought attention to it. More importantly, I have a lot of contacts within the Medical Service branch. While we have discussed this issue "around the watercooler" at work, Medical Service officers have been receiving briefings from senior members of their branch about a selectively edited account of SPC Clark's MEDEVAC mission, and what their message should be if anyone asks about it.
My contacts have highlighted that AMEDD's number one priority is protecting their "ownership" of the helicopters in question. They are concerned that removing the Red Cross from AMEDD's birds will result in those helicopters being assigned general purpose tasks, outside of the Medical Service Corp's control. In other words, their top priority is NOT providing the best possible care for our Soldiers and partners, but rather protecting their own fiefdoms. AMEDD is choosing to put Soldiers' lives in danger rather than chance losing "their" birds. Never mind that our sister services, special operations forces and allies are all able to field armed, dedicated CASEVAC/MEDEVAC helicopters! Somehow, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this is still the irrational argument AMEDD is sticking to, and directing its officers to spread. I'm concerned that in the dust-up over policy recommendations, comparisons with Pedro, and rebutting the JCS letter that we may be losing sight of the real obstacle in our path to reform. Sincere thanks for all you do, and keep up the fire!
31 January 2012
A Gold Star Mother is one who lost a child in service of the United States. Ms. Keyko Clark-Davis is a recent Gold Star Mother. I was present when her son Chazray was mortally wounded. We have communicated many times. Chazray’s mother is strong and inspirational. She sends this letter in hopes that other Americans will take a few minutes to absorb her message.
An overview of harmful Army medical evacuation practices not endorsed by other service branches, and a response to official arguments defending this policy provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).
30 January 2012
Introduction
Michael Yon is a combat writer, and a former member of the US Army Special Forces. The New York Times noted in 2008 that he’d spent more time embedded with combat units than any other journalist in Iraq, and the reporting on his blog won the Weblog Award in 2005, 2007, and 2008. It is probable that he has also spent more time with combat troops in Afghanistan than any writer, photographer, or journalist of any sort. He is widely respected inside the military and beyond for the quality of his journalism, and his pursuit of the truth alongside US and allied combat personnel in the most dangerous theaters of operation.
On 18 September 2011, Mr. Yon accompanied an element of the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 4-4 Cav, on a nighttime combat operation in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. During this mission the unit was attacked with an Improvised Explosive Device, deafening one soldier, and amputating both legs and one arm of a second—Specialist Chazray Clark. Specialist Clark was conscious and communicating up until the time he was evacuated.
US and allied forces have two primary helicopter medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets in Kandahar: US Army “Dustoff” flights, and US Air Force “Pedro” flights. Unlike Army Dustoff flights, the Pedro flights—as well as British, Dutch, US Marines, Navy, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) medical flights—do not bear the Red Cross. The core reasons for this difference involve rapid reaction and maximum flexibility with limited air assets.
Read more: 13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff
28 January 2012
While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer. I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan. He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him. With his permission, I reprint:
Message from British officer
I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.
Read more: British Officer Slams US Army on Growing MEDEVAC Debacle
(The following letter appeared on the Army Times website.)
DEADLY DELAYS
“What the hell happened to Medevac, sir?”
That was a question an angry sergeant asked me as I was eating chow last February at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, Iraq. I didn’t understand the question or the anger in his voice at the time, but I do now and would like to try to offer an explanation.
In the past, medical evacuation units reported to a medical command. These Medevac units had aviation assets, namely Black Hawk helicopters, but at the end of the day, Medical Service Corps officers were in charge. Recently, the Medevac units were realigned to fall under an aviation command as a part of the new General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB).
My unit, the 571st Medical Company (AA) became C Company, 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, and our new command decided to implement new Medevac procedures. Ultimately, it was decided that Medevac aircraft would require gunship support for all off-FOB missions even if the landing zone was reported secure.
27 January 2012
The MEDEVAC issue continues to grow. There have been many articles and it's becoming difficult to keep up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing something for Congress. My guess based on conversations is that JCS will try deflection and will not solve the issue. SecDef has done nothing, to my knowledge. And so this is set to become an election issue.
This list below is not comprehensive but can be a helpful resource.
Please listen to my interview with Dennis Miller.
LINKS
Op-eds by James Simpson
American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/01/incomprehensibly_stupid_army_regulation_killing_americans_in_afghanistan.html
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/02/no_sex_many_lies_one_videotape_and_a_soldiers_unnecessary_death.html
Breitbart Big Peace
http://bigpeace.com/jmsimpson/2012/01/09/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/
Examiner.com—D.C. Examiner
http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-washington-dc/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-afghanistan?cid=PROD-redesign-right-next
Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/
http://times247.com/articles/army-s-medevac-chopper-policy-in-need-of-revision
26 January 2012
I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt. In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls. Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot. On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas. On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently. When we got the call, we went.
When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients. No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.
Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.
Some facts as I see it:
25 January 2012
A young Iranian woman has written to me off and on for a couple of years. Yesterday she sent a note.
I responded in part with a few questions:
What do young Iranians think about our government and about the Iranian government? Also, do you think there will be war?
23 January 2012
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provided a document to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan. The document was provided with no cover or signature page. Congressman Todd Akin (MO-2), a senior HASC member, received that document. A staffer for Mr. Akin passed the letter to me asking questions.
I publicly acknowledged receipt of the JCS letter before publishing it. My acknowledgement prompted an email to me from the Public Affairs Officer for the Vice Chairman of the JCS.
Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Seiber (Public Affairs Officer to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) wrote to me, “Your citing of a JCS letter is inaccurate. Please correct/update your website accordingly. Background information is below:" I immediately contacted Congressman Akin’s office. A staffer again confirmed that this document came from JCS to HASC. The denial by JCS itched for explanation. JCS then backtracked, saying it had provided the letter to HASC, and “We don't necessarily refute what is in the document itself, it's just a matter that it isn't a Joint Staff document.”
21 January 2012
This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge. We led the horse to water.
Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.
The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan. Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison. Yet this is their home. There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people. We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters. Time to come home.
Sincerely,
Michael Yon
20 January 2012
What do you think of Lieutenant General John F. Campbell's remarks in this video?
Please click to view.
19 January 2012
I published a letter that I received from Congressman Todd Akin's office. Mr. Akin is on the House Armed Services Committee. According to Mr. Akin's office, HASC received the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After I published the letter, I read an email to me from a Public Affairs Officer at JCS saying JCS didn't author the letter.
Curiouser and Curiouser.
And so just now I contacted a staffer at Congressman Akin's office who responds:
19 January 2012
The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a bogus letter on MEDEVAC to the House Armed Services Committee. The JCS letter is so filled with errors and deceptions that it has taken more than a week for me to respond. The JCS directly refutes my work on MEDEVAC.
Thirteen pilots have read my draft response. Ten of those pilots are Pedro or Dustoff. (Five each.) The remaining three have or do fly MEDEVAC escort in Afghanistan. Twelve are active duty and one is retired. All have served in Afghanistan or are there. Some also served in Iraq. Together they have done about 25 combat tours.
Details are crucial. Other veterans, and civilians, are providing feedback to keep my response to the JCS accurate. My response should be ready by Monday.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense, Senators, and Representatives are cautioned to avoid embarrassment by not taking the JCS letter at face value.
Representative Todd Akin (MO-2) has rejected the JCS letter and directly contacted Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.
The JCS letter to the HASC:
You can download a pdf version here.
18 January 2012
The bad judgment exercised by a handful of Marines should be treated like an ND: a Negligent Discharge. In the US military, if you “accidentally” pull the trigger and launch an unplanned bullet downrange, you should not even bother trying to explain away the “accident.” If that bullet kills someone, it’s called Negligent Homicide. The bullet did not fire accidentally; it was fired negligently. Bottom line.
This should be treated like a negligent discharge of the penis, and of the video camera, and then of common sense. What a dumb thing to do. And super dumb to video tape it. And ultra-dumb to then let the video make it to the Internet.
Army Deceptions May Cause Embarrassment
17 January 2012
The Army has been deceiving members of Congress about MEDEVAC issues in Afghanistan. This poses a danger for civilian leadership who may run with the Army information, expecting accuracy in detail and in spirit, only to be ridiculed later.
In Afghanistan, I first brought up the MEDEVAC issue at Task Force Spartan in Zhari District, but this was above their level. There was excellent leadership at TF Spartan, yet nothing to push because there was little they could do.
Next, Regional Command South in Kandahar addressed the issue but did nothing.
Next, the IJC (combatant command in Kabul) did nothing. The issue was taken up by ISAF HQ in Kabul, who did nothing. (When I write, “nothing,” it means they wrote false accounts of the events and demanded that I publish them. I refused.)
16 January 2012
Caring people are becoming involved from Hawaii to Texas to Washington. There has even been help from the United Kingdom. Thank you in the UK!
Please see this OpEd from Larry Wood in Alaska:
Order your copy today.